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Recent decades have seen momentum build towards some form of 
international legal recognition of animal rights.2 This article considers 
whether, in line with the approach taken to international human rights 
recognition, such recognition should be based on a concept of animal 
dignity. In this respect, this article explores the legal meaning of dignity 
in international human rights law and the extent to which it can and 
should be transposed to international legal recognition of animal rights. It 
is contended that such utilisation would be desirable, provided that it 
does not impede progress towards international legal recognition of 
animal rights. 
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Clare McCausland, United Nations Declaration on Animal Welfare: Why Not Rights?
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I. INTRODUCTION
[C]ircus animals are being forced to perform unnatural tricks, are 
housed in cramped cages, subjected to fear, hunger, pain, not to 
mention the undignified way of life they have to live … Though not 
homosapiens, they are also beings entitled to dignified existences and 
humane treatment sans cruelty and torture … If humans are entitled to 
fundamental rights, why not animals?3   
The last seven decades have seen a proliferation of laws establishing 
human rights and a corresponding recognition of the growing importance 
of human rights and the laws that protect and foster them.4 Following the 
creation of the International Bill of Human Rights,5 a multitude of more 
specific international treaties have entered into force6 and numerous 
states have passed domestic legislation implementing these norms.7 This 
growing recognition of human rights was initiated by outrage at the 
horrors of the Holocaust and other massacres of World War II in order to 
prevent the reoccurrence of such atrocities.8
3. Nair v. Union of India, AIR 2000 (Ker.) 340, ¶ 13 (India).
4. See Mirko Bagaric & Penny Dimopoulos, International Human Rights Law:
All Show, No Go, 4 J. HUM. RTS 3 (2005) [hereinafter International Human Rights Law: 
All Show, No Go].   
5. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the UN
General Assembly on 10 December 1948. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. The 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention 
on Economic and Social Rights were adopted on 16 December 1966. See International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 18, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]; see also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
6. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD]; see also 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; see also Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]. 
7. See, e.g., Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.); see also New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990; see also Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5754 (Isr.). 
8. Jürgen Habermas, The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of
Human Rights, 41 METAPHILOSOPHY 464, 465–66 (2010). 
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While human rights are frequently breached,9 their growing 
importance has produced a “language of human rights” which serves to 
increase the scrutiny of human treatment and can result in improved 
outcomes.10 Many international human rights treaties, such as the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),11 the 
International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR),12 and the International Convention on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD),13 require signatory states to regularly 
report to a Convention body in relation to human rights within their 
territory.14 Other mechanisms to ensure scrutiny and publicize human 
rights abuses include special rapporteurs, mechanisms to enable people 
to complain of rights violations, and the work of independent human 
rights advocates.15 While it is difficult to assess the effect of increased 
scrutiny on human rights generally, formal international and domestic 
dispute resolution processes demonstrate that some positive outcomes 
have been achieved.16 For example, in the case of Toonen v. Australia, an 
individual complaint lodged with the Human Rights Committee resulted 
in the decriminalization of homosexual sex in Tasmania.17 In Colombia, 
9. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2017: EVENTS OF 2016 137, 267
(2017), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2017-web.pdf; 
see also Raziye Akkoc, How the World Violates Human Rights, Country by Country,
TELEGRAPH (Feb. 2, 2015, 12:18 PM),  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/11381744/How-the-world-violates-human-
rights-country-by-country.html. 
10. Navanethem Pillay, What are Human Rights For? Three Personal
Reflections, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 4 (Daniel Moeckli et al. eds., 2nd ed. 
2014); see also International Human Rights Law: All Show, No Go, supra note 4, at 3. 
11. See ICCPR, supra note 5.
12. See ICESCR, supra note 5.
13. See CERD, supra note 6.
14. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER,
Human Rights Bodies, OHCHR, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx (last visited Apr. 
30, 2017). 
15. Jane Connors & Markus Schmidt, United Nations, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW, supra note 10, at 359, 362, 366. 
16. See, e.g., Toonen v. Australia, Communication 488/1992, Human Rights
Committee (Mar. 31, 1994); see generally BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 245–53 (2009). 
17. AUSTL. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, HUMAN RIGHTS EXPLAINED: CASE STUDIES:
COMPLAINTS ABOUT AUSTRALIA TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 1 (2009),
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women were able to use the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) as a tool to 
influence the development of a new constitution.18 More broadly, it is 
unclear whether ratification of human rights treaties results in improved 
human rights performance.19 It is likely, however, that the creation and 
support for such treaties has a broader effect on what states perceive to 
be acceptable behaviour.20
In some ways similar to outrage at the atrocities of World War II, 
contemporary times have seen a growing awareness of, and horror at, the 
persecution and killing of animals.21 Animals are increasingly exploited 
in many contexts.22 In sports, for example, greyhounds have been 
reported to be subject to overbreeding, mass killing, poor conditions, and 
ill-treatment.23 Animals are used in scientific testing, research, and 
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/human-rights-explained-case-studies-complaints-about-
australia-human-rights-committee. 
18. SIMMONS, supra note 16, at 245; see also CERD, supra note 6.
19. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111
YALE L.J. 1935, 1940–41 (2002); see also International Human Rights Law: All Show, 
No Go, supra note 4, at 7.  
20. Hathaway, supra note 19, at 2020–21.
21. Note that this paper uses the term ‘animal’ to refer to all animals, excluding
human beings. While human beings are themselves animals, this popular use of the term 
animal is helpful for the purposes of clear communication. See Josefin Dolsten, 
Holocaust Survivor Likens Treatment of Farm Animals to Modern-Day Shoa, JEWISH 
TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY (Oct. 6, 2016 3:40 PM), http://www.jta.org/2016/10/06/news-
opinion/united-states/holocaust-survivor-likens-treatment-of-farm-animals-to-modern-
day-shoah (Oct. 6, 2016) (discussing contemporary awareness); see also Steven J. 
Bartlett, Roots of Human Resistance to Animal Rights: Psychological and Conceptual 
Blocks, 8 ANIMAL L. 143, 155–58 (2002); see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Animal Rights: 
The Need for a Theoretical Basis, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1506, 1509–11 (2001) (reviewing 
STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000)) 
[hereinafter Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical Basis]; see also PETER SINGER,
ANIMAL LIBERATION 22, 136–37 (2nd ed. 1990). 
22. See generally MIRKO BAGARIC & KEITH AKERS, HUMANISING ANIMALS:
CIVILISING PEOPLE (2012) [hereinafter HUMANISING ANIMALS: CIVILISING PEOPLE]. 
23. PETA, Greyhound Racing: Death in the Fast Lane, PETA,
http://www.peta.org/issues/animals-in-entertainment/animals-used-entertainment-
factsheets/greyhound-racing-death-fast-lane/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2017); see also 
Bernard Keane, Left and Right Revel in the Pointless Cruelty of Greyhound Racing,
CRIKEY (July 11, 2016), https://www.crikey.com.au/2016/07/11/greyhound-racing-ban/; 
see also What are you Really Betting on?, ANIMALS AUSTL. & ANIMAL LIBERATION
QUEENSL., http://greyhoundcruelty.com/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2017). 
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teaching,24 despite queries over the benefit of such testing25 and despite 
the development of new computer software which could potentially take 
the place of animals in some of this research.26 Perhaps most concerning 
is the growth and commercialisation of animals in the food industry.27
Livestock are frequently subject to reduced legal protection compared to 
other animals.28 Livestock are often kept in very small and unnatural 
spaces, provided with minimal or insufficient food and water, and 
subjected to painful practices such as de-beaking, branding, cropping, 
and castration.29 At the same time, research suggests that many animals 
have greater levels of intelligence and sentience than previously 
thought.30 Yet despite the systematic and barbaric nature of 
contemporary exploitation of animals, much of this practice is within the 
law.31 This issue has prompted some to argue for the law to be changed 
24. SONIA WAISMAN, PAMELA FRASCH, & BRUCE WAGMAN, ANIMAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 475 (5th ed. 2014). 
25. Andrew Knight, Animals in Research: Do the Costs Outweigh the Benefits?,
CONVERSATION (Aug. 6, 2013 4:11 PM), https://theconversation.com/animals-in-
research-do-the-costs-outweigh-the-benefits-16390; see also Monika Merkes, Animal 
Research Provides a Flawed Model, So Why Not Stop?, CONVERSATION (Aug. 5, 2012 
4:16 PM), https://theconversation.com/animal-research-provides-a-flawed-model-so-
why-not-stop-7890; see also WAISMAN, FRASCH, & WAGMAN, supra note 23, at 476–79.  
26. See Timna Jacks, Calls to Stop Animal Testing at University, AGE (July 29,
2016), http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/calls-to-stop-animal-testing-at-university-
20160728-gqfwux.html. 
27. See WAISMAN, FRASCH, & WAGMAN, supra note 23, at 377.
28. How Laws are Failing Animals: Codes of Cruelty, ANIMALS AUSTL.,
http://www.animalsaustralia.org/issues/codes-of-cruelty.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2017); 
see also WAISMAN, FRASCH, & WAGMAN, supra note 23, at 378–79, 403.  
29. How Laws are Failing Animals: Codes of Cruelty, supra note 28; see also
Factory Farming, VOICELESS, https://www.voiceless.org.au/the-issues/factory-farming 
(last updated June 2017). 
30. Clint J. Perry, Are Animals As Smart, Or As Dumb, As We Think They Are?,
CONVERSATION (Oct. 28, 2013 3:20 PM), https://theconversation.com/are-animals-as-
smart-or-as-dumb-as-we-think-they-are-18986; see also Marc Bekoff, After 2,500 
Studies, It’s Time To Declare Animal Sentience Proven, LIVE SCIENCE (Sept. 6, 2013), 
http://www.livescience.com/39481-time-to-declare-animal-sentience.html; see also Marc 
Bekoff, Scientists Conclude Nonhuman Animals Are Conscious Beings, PSYCHOL. TODAY
(Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/animal-
emotions/201208/scientists-conclude-nonhuman-animals-are-conscious-beings. 
31. See generally HUMANISING ANIMALS: CIVILISING PEOPLE, supra note 22, ch.
6, 7. 
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to introduce and improve animal rights and welfare.32 The last few 
decades have seen various attempts to recognise animal rights in 
international law.33
Within this context, this article considers one of the key concepts and 
justifications of human rights law — that of dignity.34 Major human
rights documents refer to human dignity as the foundation for the 
creation of human rights law.35 For example, the preambles to the ICCPR 
and ICESCR assert that “rights derive from the inherent dignity of the 
human person.”36 In this respect, human dignity is said to provide the 
reason for the existence of human rights and also operates as an aid to 
interpret specific human rights.37 Given the centrality of the concept of 
human dignity in this respect, this article considers whether the 
foundational concept of dignity might also be extended to animals — in
other words, whether there is such a thing, as the High Court of Kerala 
asserts, as animal dignity.38 To determine whether this is the case, this 
article seeks to develop an understanding of what is meant by human 
dignity in international human rights law. Having considered the 
meaning of human dignity, this article considers whether the concept of 
dignity can and should provide the basis for an international recognition 
32. See Martha Nussbaum, Beyond “Compassion and Humanity”: Justice for
Nonhuman Animals, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 299, 
299–300 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2005); see generally Gary 
L. Francione, Animal Rights Theory and Utilitarianism: Relative Normative Guidance, 3 
ANIMAL L. 75 (1997); see generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 387 (2003); see generally Valerio Pocar, Animal Rights: A Socio-Legal 
Perspective, 19 J. L. & SOC’Y 214 (1992). 
33. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Animal Rights (proposed Oct. 15, 1978)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration of Animal Rights 1978]; see, e.g., International 
Convention for the Protection of Animals (proposed Apr. 4, 1988); see infra Section 
III.b. 
34. Paolo G. Carozza, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human
Rights: A Reply, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 931, 932 (2008). 
35. ICCPR, supra note 5, pbml.; see also ICESCR, supra note 5, pmbl.
36. ICCPR, supra note 5, pbml.; see also ICESCR, supra note 5, pmbl.
37. Luís Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in
Contemporary Law and in the Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
331, 392 (2012). 
38. Note that while it is possible to recognize animal dignity as a valid concept in
its own right, or as a concept linked to that of human dignity, this article pursues the latter 
approach. See discussion infra Section III.C. 
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of animal rights. It is contended that, while the substance of human 
dignity is vague in some respects, its key elements comprise a 
recognition of inherent value, equal to all persons, which must be 
respected by others. Given that the concept of dignity plays an important 
function in identifying those individuals entitled to equal moral 
consideration, it should therefore be utilised, where practicable, in any 
international legal agreement to respect animal rights. Part I of this paper 
looks at the meaning of human dignity in international human rights law, 
including the meaning of the plain language, the intended meaning, and 
its interpretation in practice. In Part II, the paper looks at whether the 
concept of dignity can and should provide the basis for the international 
recognition of animal rights.  
There is a wealth of scholarship and commentary in relation to the 
concept of human dignity.39 While human dignity can be considered from 
a number of different disciplinary perspectives and has a rich history pre-
dating its appearance in international treaties,40 this article will be limited 
to a consideration of human dignity from a legal perspective. Further, 
while the concept of human dignity is relevant to human rights law at the 
international, regional, and domestic levels, the analysis in this article 
will be confined to international human rights law. In this respect, 
analysis of the practical use of the term is limited to the decisions of 
major treaty bodies. These limitations are appropriate in the context of 
the purpose of this article — to determine whether the legal concept of
dignity might be drawn upon to underpin the international recognition of 
animal rights. 
39. See generally Habermas, supra note 8; see also GEORGE KATEB, HUMAN
DIGNITY (2011); see also THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
DISCOURSE (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002); see also MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP
(2006) (each discussing the concept of human dignity) [hereinafter FRONTIERS OF 
JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP]. 
40. See KATEB, supra note 39, at 4–9.
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II. THE CONCEPT OF DIGNITY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
a. Dignity in the Legal Documentation
The concept of dignity is foundational to modern international human 
rights law.41 By agreeing to the Charter of the United Nations (UN 
Charter), member states “reaffirm[] their faith in . . . the dignity and 
worth of the human person.”42 According to the major human rights 
documents, human rights arise as a result of the “inherent dignity of the 
human person.”43 It was the repeated and gross violation of human 
dignity during World War II that provided the impetus for the creation of 
the United Nations and the development of subsequent global human 
rights treaties.44 Human rights can therefore be considered as specific 
descriptions of what human dignity entails.45
While the concepts of human rights and human dignity existed long 
before the passage of the International Bill of Human Rights, it was only 
at that point in time that the concept of human dignity was incorporated 
into legal instruments as a justification for human rights.46 Its rise to 
prominence in this respect was significant because “[r]espect for human 
dignity is the one explicit underlying principle of the International Bill of 
Human Rights.”47 The International Bill of Human Rights is comprised 
of three documents, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), the ICCPR, and the ICESCR.48 Each of these documents are 
underpinned by reference to human dignity. 
41. Kyle Ash, International Animal Rights: Speciesism and Exclusionary Human
Dignity, 11 ANIMAL L. 195, 196 (2005); see also Arthur Chaskalson, Human Dignity as a 
Constitutional Value, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE,
supra note 39, at 133. (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002). 
42. UDHR, supra note 5, pmbl.
43. Sandesh Sivakumaran, International Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 10, 
at 479, 483. 
44. Habermas, supra note 8, at 465.
45. Id. at 464.
46. Id. at 465; see also Klaus Dicke, The Founding Function of Human Dignity in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN
HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE, supra note 39, at 111, 112. 
47. Nigel S. Rodley, Integrity of the Person, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW supra note 10, at 174, 174. 
48. International Human Rights Law: All Show, No Go, supra note 4, at 3.
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The UDHR is the foundation of modern international human rights 
law.49 Within the Preamble of the UDHR, “inherent dignity” is referred 
to as founding “freedom, justice and peace.”50 The concept of dignity is 
also referred to in specific articles of the UDHR.51 Article 1 asserts that 
“[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”52
Article 22 declares that “economic, social and cultural rights” are 
indispensable for human dignity.53 Further, Article 23 establishes a right 
to remuneration for work to ensure “an existence worthy of human 
dignity.”54
The ICCPR and ICESCR also make significant reference to dignity. 
The preambles of both Conventions claim that recognition of “the 
inherent dignity and . . . rights” of human beings “is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world.”55 Similarly, both preambles 
assert that “[human] rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human 
person.”56 The ICCPR also references dignity in Article 10, which states 
that “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity 
and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.”57
Similarly, in ICESCR, states parties agree that “education shall be 
directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense 
of its dignity.”58
Reference to human dignity is also found in other key international 
human rights treaties. The ICERD is premised on the respect for human 
dignity manifested in the UN Charter, UDHR, and UN Declaration on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.59 Similarly, 
CEDAW references human dignity in the UN Charter and UDHR and 
49. The Foundation of International Human Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/foundation-international-human-
rights-law/index.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2017). 
50. UDHR, supra note 5, pmbl.
51. Id. arts. 1, 22, 23.
52. Id. art. 1.
53. Id. art. 22.
54. Id. art. 23.
55. ICCPR, supra note 5, pmbl.; see also ICESCR, supra note 5, pmbl.
56. ICCPR, supra note 5, pmbl.; see also ICESCR, supra note 5, pmbl.
57. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 10(1).
58. ICESCR, supra note 5, at 13(1). The term ‘states parties’ refers to those states
that have adhered to the relevant legal document, in this case ICESCR. 
59. CERD, supra note 6, pmbl.
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asserts that “discrimination against women violates the principles of . . . 
human dignity.”60 The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment recognizes that human 
rights “derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.”61 Further, 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child makes numerous references to 
human dignity, which extends to the child.62 The International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD), and the International Convention for the Protection 
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance also make reference to 
human dignity.63 As McCrudden notes, the term human dignity has been 
increasingly used not only in the preambles to such international 
conventions but also in relation to substantive rights set out within 
them.64
The influence of the concept of human dignity is also apparent in 
regional and national legal documentation. Protocol No 13 to the 
European Convention on Human Rights references the “inherent dignity 
of all human beings,”65 which is a significant concept when interpreting 
the Convention.66 Dignity is an important concept in many state 
constitutions, for example: Finland, South Africa, Germany, Brazil, 
Angola, Belgium, Bulgaria, Peru, and Hungary.67 Dignity has also been a 
60. CEDAW, supra note 6, pmbl.
61. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, pmbl., Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. 
62. CRC, supra note 6, pmbl., arts. 23(1), 28(2), 37(c), 39, 40(1).
63. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families, arts. 17(1), 70, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3; 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, pmbl., arts. 1, 3(a), 8(1)(a), 16(4), 
24(1)(a), 25(d), Jan. 24, 2007, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, arts. 19(2), 24(5)(c), Dec. 20, 
2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3.
64. Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of
Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 670 (2008). 
65. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
pmbl., Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
66. Mirko Bagaric & James Allan, The Vacuous Concept of Dignity, 5 J. HUM.
RTS., 257, 261 (2006) [hereinafter The Vacuous Concept of Dignity].
67. Id. at 262–63.
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significant idea in the case law of numerous jurisdictions, including the 
United States, Canada, and New Zealand.68
b. The Meaning of Human Dignity
In terms of determining what the meaning of “dignity” is, the context 
in which the word is used must be considered.69 Further, reference to its 
dictionary meaning may be helpful.70 According to the Oxford 
Dictionary, dignity has the following meanings:  
1. The state or quality of being worthy of honour or respect.
1.1 A high rank or position. 
2. A composed or serious manner or style.
2.1 A sense of pride in oneself; self-respect.71
In the context of the international legal documents discussed above, 
the first meaning appears to be the one drawn upon.72 Human dignity 
belongs to all human beings equally,73 thus definition 1.1 would not be 
appropriate. Defining dignity as a “composed or serious manner”74 would 
make little sense in terms of attributing rights to human beings. Finally, 
while dignity should give rise to self-respect, self-respect is not a 
necessary precondition for rights, which are more concerned with 
mandating the respect of others.  
Thus, the phrase “human dignity” seems to suggest that there is 
something inherent in human beings which warrants honour and respect. 
68. Id. at 263; see also Gerald L. Neuman, Human Dignity in United States
Constitutional Law, in ZUR AUTONOMIE DES INDIVIDUUMS: LIBER AMICORUM SPIROS
SIMITIS 249, 249 (Dieter Simon & Manfred Weiss eds. 2000) [hereinafter Human Dignity 
in United States Constitutional Law] (discussing the development of dignity in the U.S.). 
69. MICHELLE SANSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 115–16 (Trischa Baker ed.,
2012). 
70. See id. at 120–21.
71. Dignity, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/dignity (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). 
72. Although it is acknowledged that the meanings are interrelated.
73. UDHR, supra note 5, art. 1.
74. Dignity, supra note 71.
2017] Dignity in International Human Rights Law 13
When one speaks about offending somebody’s dignity, they tend to refer 
to words or actions that cause another extreme embarrassment, 
humiliation, or discomfort that would be considered disrespectful. 
Indeed, Luban argues that “non-humiliation” can act as a surrogate for 
human dignity.75 For example, in relation to Abu Ghraib, a United States 
Army detention centre which operated between 2003 and 2006, the abuse 
and torture of prisoners has been referred to as an offense against human 
dignity.76
McCrudden’s “basic minimum content” framework is helpful in 
understanding the meaning of human dignity.77 The first element of the 
framework is the ontological claim, namely the notion that every human 
being possesses an intrinsic worth — that is, to merely be human.78 The
second element, referred to as the relational claim, is that “intrinsic worth 
should be recognized and respected by others, and some forms of 
treatment by others are inconsistent with . . . respect for this intrinsic 
worth.”79 The final element of McCrudden’s framework relates to the 
relationship between the individual and the state.80 This element 
highlights that, given the intrinsic worth of the individual, “the state 
exists for the sake of the individual human beings, and not vice versa.”81
This is known as the limited-state claim.82
75. David Luban, Human Rights Pragmatism and Human Dignity, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 263, 277 (Rowan Cruft et al. eds., 
2015); see also Daniel Statman, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS
DISCOURSE, supra note 39, at 209, 209; see also Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a 
Normative Concept, 77 AM.J. INT’L L. 848, 850 (1983). 
76. See, e.g., Gregory Hooks & Clayton James Mosher, Outrages Against
Personal Dignity: Rationalizing Abuse and Torture in the War on Terror, 83 SOC.
FORCES 1627, 1627 (2005). 
77. McCrudden, supra note 64, at 679, 689–90.
78. Id. at 679.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id. This definition is similar to the following one offered by Neuman,
that human beings possess an intrinsic worth that should be
recognized and respected; . . . that the state exists for the sake of
individual human beings, and not vice versa; that some forms of
treatment of individuals are inconsistent with respect for this
intrinsic worth, and that individuals have a right not to be
subjected to such treatment; and that this intrinsic worth and the
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While it is reasonably clear that human dignity refers to an inherent 
value equally possessed by human beings, which warrants honour and 
respect, this meaning leaves some aspects of the term unclear.83 It is not 
clear, for example, what it is about human beings that gives rise to their 
dignity.84 Further, if dignity arises by virtue of some common human 
characteristic (such as rationality), do those human beings without that 
characteristic still have dignity? Moreover, is dignity the sole domain of 
the human species or can other species also have dignity? In sum, the 
actual substance of the concept of human dignity is unclear. 
c. Intended Meaning
This section will consider the meaning of human dignity intended by 
the drafters of the relevant legal documents by looking at textual context, 
historical context, and the purpose of the relevant international 
documents. 
i. Textual Context
In relation to textual context, the language of the international treaties 
suggests that human dignity is something intrinsic to human beings.85
This is suggested by the word “inherent,” which prefaces the word 
“dignity” in the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR preambles.86 The assertion 
in the UDHR preamble that human beings are born with dignity supports 
this inference.87 In this respect, human beings are equal in their dignity.88
consequent right cannot be lost, alienated or forfeited (although 
the right might in fact be violated). 
Human Dignity in United States Constitutional Law, supra note 68, at 249–50.
83. See Human Dignity in United States Constitutional Law, supra note 68, at
250. 
84. The Vacuous Concept of Dignity, supra note 66, at 268–69.
85. Pablo Gilabert, Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Power, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 75, at 196, 197; see also 
Dicke, supra note 46, at 114; see also Schachter, supra note 75, at 849.
86. UDHR, supra note 5, pmbl.; ICCPR, supra note 5, pmbl.; ICESCR, supra
note 5, pmbl.; see also CAT, supra note 61, pmbl.; see also MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY:
ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 9 (2012). 
87. UDHR, supra note 5, pmbl.; see also id. art. 1; see also Viviana Bohórquez
Monsalve & Javier Aguirre Román, Tensions of Human Dignity: Conceptualization and 
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The documents also indicate that human dignity gives rise to human 
rights.89 This is a direct result of the phrasing in the ICCPR and ICESCR 
preambles, which both state “[human] rights derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person.”90 In this respect, the UDHR appears to 
suggest the existence of particular qualities in human beings upon which 
dignity rests.91 Article 1 of the UDHR states that human beings are born 
equal in dignity and follows this statement with an assertion that “[t]hey 
are endowed with reason and conscience.”92 This perhaps suggests that 
there is some link between these qualities and dignity. Finegan explains 
that the inclusion of this phrase was at the behest of Charles Malik, one 
of the drafters of the UDHR.93 Malik wished to include the phrase 
because he felt that reason and conscience were “the qualities which 
essentially characterized man, since man and his rights were the 
Commission’s main concern.”94
The international documents may be interpreted as containing some 
discrepancies in relation to their treatment of dignity. While the preamble 
of the UDHR states that human beings are born equal in dignity, Article 
22 states that “economic, social and cultural rights [are] indispensable for 
. . . dignity.”95 Article 22 might be interpreted as meaning that without
the enjoyment of such rights, humans do not have dignity.96 Similarly, 
while the ICESCR preamble refers to “inherent dignity,” Article 13 
indicates that education is to be directed towards developing a sense of 
dignity.97 Article 13 might be taken to mean that human dignity must be 
Application to International Human Rights Law, 6 INT’L J. ON HUM. RTS. 39, 45–46
(2009); see also Thomas Finegan, Conceptual Foundations of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights: Human Rights, Human Dignity and Personhood, 37 AUSTL. J. LEGAL 
PHIL. 182, 185 (2012). 
88. Finegan, supra note 87, at 197.
89. ICCPR, supra note 5, pmbl.; ICESCR, supra note 5, pmbl.; CAT, supra note
61, pmbl.; see also Gilabert, supra note 85, at 197–200. 
90. ICCPR, supra note 5, pmbl.; ICESCR, supra note 5, pmbl.; CAT, supra note
61, pmbl.
91. See Gilabert, supra note 85, at 197–200.
92. UDHR, supra note 5, art. 1; see also Finegan, supra note 87, at 186.
93. Finegan, supra note 87, at 186.
94. U.N. ESCOR, 3rd Sess., 50th mtg., at 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.50 (June 4,
1948).
95. UDHR, supra note 5, art. 22.
96. See Gilabert, supra note 85, at 197.
97. ICESCR, supra note 5, art. 13(1).
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developed rather than being an intrinsic characteristic of human beings.98
While such discrepancies might exist, it is more likely that they are the 
result of compromise in the drafting process than that they detract from 
the key characteristics of human dignity described above. 
ii. Historical Context
1. Historical Roots of the Concept of Human Dignity
While the concept of human dignity only became significant in 
international human rights law following the creation of the International 
Bill of Rights, it has a long history in philosophical thinking. At the same 
time, there have been “distinct strands in the meaning of dignity” and 
“dignity has not always been seen as something that is restricted to 
human beings alone.”99 Originally, dignity was related to social status 
and position and the respect that was owed to people in those 
positions.100 In this respect, Cicero asserted that dignity was “someone’s 
virtuous authority which makes him worthy to be [honoured] with regard 
and respect.”101 At the same time, dignity was also used with respect to 
all human beings; Cicero contrasted the superior nature (and thus 
dignity) of human beings to that of animals.102 Cicero’s understanding of 
human dignity was continued during the Renaissance period.103 One of 
the features of humanism during the Renaissance period was the focus on 
the dignity of human beings.104 According to Singer, an influential 
philosopher and animal rights advocate, “the Renaissance humanists 
emphasized the uniqueness of human beings, their free will, their 
98. See Gilabert, supra note 85, at 197–98.
99. ROSEN, supra note 86, at 8.
100. Id. at 11.
101. Hubert Cancik, Dignity of Man and Persona on Stoic Anthropology: Some 
Remarks on Cicero, De Officiis, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS
DISCOURSE, supra note 39, at FIRST PAGE, 23. Marcus Tullius Cicero was a Roman 
statesman, scholar and writer who lived from 106 BCE to 43 BCE. John P.V. Dacre 
Balsdon & John Ferguson, Marcus Tullius Cicero, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.britannica.com/biography/Cicero. He has been 
credited with introducing the term human dignity. Luban, supra note 75, at 274. 
102. ROSEN, supra note 86, at 12.
103. SINGER, supra note 21, at 198.
104. Id. at 198. 
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potential, and their dignity; and they contrasted all this with the limited 
nature of the ‘lower animals.’”105 In terms of dignity itself, Catholic 
philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas understood the term as simply referring 
to something’s intrinsic value, which may extend beyond human beings 
to other members of God’s creation.106 Further, while not specifically 
mentioning the word dignity, Bentham famously asserted that the criteria 
for moral consideration should be “not, Can they reason? nor, Can they 
talk? but, Can they suffer?”107 In post-World War II discussions, the 
concept of dignity has grown in importance and has been heavily 
influenced by the ideas of Immanuel Kant, a philosopher whose work has 
been credited with influencing the modern doctrine of human rights.108
According to Kant, the basis for human dignity (or “unconditional, 
incomparable value”) is human autonomy.109 In terms of what has 
dignity, for Kant it is only “morality, and humanity itself insofar as it is 
capable of morality.”110 In modern discourse, the concept of dignity 
remains focused on “the (special) place of humans in nature,”111 but has 
lost its “physical and religious shackles.”112
2. Impetus Behind the Creation of the UDHR
To understand the meaning of human dignity, it is important to 
consider world events at the time of the creation of the UDHR.113 As 
noted above, the UDHR (and consequent human rights covenants) 
represented a response to the atrocities of two world wars and, in 
105. Id. at 199; see also ROSEN, supra note 86, at 14.  
106. ROSEN, supra note 86, at 17. 
107. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 311 n.1 (1823). 
108. ROSEN, supra note 86, at 10, 19.
109. Id. at 22.
110. Id.
111. Raymond Corbey, “Race” and Species in the Post-World War II United 
Nations Discourse on Human Rights, in THE POLITICS OF SPECIES: RESHAPING OUR
RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ANIMALS 67, 69 (Raymond Corbey & Annette Lanjouw eds., 
2013). 
112. SINGER, supra note 21, at 238. 
113. See Dicke, supra note 46, at 120; see also Yehoshua Arieli, On the Necessary 
and Sufficient Conditions for the Emergence of the Doctrine of the Dignity of Man and 
His Rights, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE, supra 
note 39, at 1, 1.  
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particular, a response to the terrible actions perpetrated during the 
Holocaust of World War II.114 In terms of the phrase “human dignity” 
then, this concept might be seen as a response to the notion of “dignity of 
the state” which was important in Nazi Germany.115 In other words, 
“human dignity” might be interpreted as a statement that it is the 
individual which has inherent worth and that the state is in place only to 
serve the individual, not vice versa. More broadly, as Arieli asserts, 
human dignity and human rights should be seen as “counter-thesis and 
counter-ideology . . . to the ideologies of the Axis Powers and in 
particular to National Socialism.”116
3. Drafting History
The lack of clarity contained in the ordinary meaning of the phrase 
“human dignity” was apparent at the time of drafting the various 
international documents. The reference to “free and equal in dignity and 
rights” in Article 1 of the UDHR was added by René Cassin, who told 
the drafting committee that “[t]he text was trying to convey the idea that 
the most humble men of the most different races have among them the 
particular spark that distinguishes them from animals, and at the same 
time obligates them to more grandeur and to more duties than any other 
beings on earth.”117 Nevertheless, it is not clear that Cassin’s view was 
shared amongst the drafters.118 Rather, according to Beitz, “we cannot 
say from the record that the framers of either document had any 
articulate or agreed conception of human dignity or that their views of 
the nature or substance of human rights were much influenced by it.”119
Further, it has been suggested that the lack of clarity inherent in the 
term “human dignity” was understood by the drafters of the UDHR.120
114. See supra Section I. 
115. Jochen Frowein, Human Dignity in International Law, in THE CONCEPT OF 
HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE, supra note 39, at 121, 123. 
116. Arieli, supra note 113, at 3. 
117. Charles R. Beitz, Human Dignity in the Theory of Human Rights: Nothing but 
a Phrase?, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 259, 267 (2013) (quoting U.N. Comm’n on Human 
Rights, 1st Sess., 8th summ. mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.8 (June 20, 1947). 
118. See id. at 267. 
119. Id. at 268. 
120. Serena Parekh, Resisting “Dull and Torpid” Assent: Returning to the Debate 
Over the Foundations of Human Rights, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 754, 763 (2007). 
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Rather than include a definition or explain the source of human dignity in 
the UDHR, the drafters chose to omit such reference.121 This omission 
enabled states to reach a consensus in relation to the existence of human 
dignity and the specific rights which flowed from the concept without 
having to come to some consensus as to the meaning of human dignity.122
In other words, having to define the meaning of human dignity would 
likely have proven an obstacle to the creation of the UDHR (and 
subsequent human rights conventions). In this light, the phrase “human 
dignity” may be considered somewhat of a placeholder, enabling states 
to infer into it their own understandings of the meaning of the term.123
iii. Purpose
The meaning of provisions within human rights treaties must be 
understood “in light of the object[s] and purpose[s]” of the relevant 
treaty.124 The ICCPR, the ICESCR, and other main international human 
rights treaties are human rights instruments that create legally binding 
obligations on states parties to respect human rights.125 It is clear from 
the preambles to the ICCPR and the ICESCR that they are dedicated to 
particular values: dignity, equality, freedom, justice, and peace.126
Further, the preambles of the ICCPR and the ICESCR indicate that 
respect for human rights is believed to establish “freedom, justice and 
peace” and will lead to the enjoyment of political and civil freedom.127
Thus, the phrase “human dignity” must be understood in light of these 
objects and purposes. This means understanding human dignity in a way 
that will give meaning and operation to the rights set out in the relevant 
treaties. Such interpretation must accord with the values that underpin 
121. Luban, supra note 75, at 22; see also Beitz, supra note 117, at 259; see also 
Dicke, supra note 46, at 118. 
122. See Audrey R. Chapman, Human Dignity, Bioethics, and Human Rights, 3 
AMSTERDAM L.F. 3, 4–5 (2011). 
123. McCrudden, supra note 64, at 677–80. While the phrase “human dignity”
operates in this way, it is not contended that it is devoid of meaning, just that it lacks 
clarity and entails a degree of subjective interpretation. Habermas, supra note 8, at 466. 
124. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
125. See The Foundation of International Human Rights Law, supra note 49. 
126. ICCPR, supra note 5, pmbl.; ICESCR, supra note 5, pmbl.
127. ICCPR, supra note 5, pmbl.; ICESCR, supra note 5, pmbl.
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the treaties, including the professed purposes of “freedom, justice and 
peace.” It follows that the interpretation of human dignity should be 
expansive, in line with the rights enumerated in the relevant treaties, and 
accord with a vision of a peaceful, just, and free world. 
d. Meaning in Practice
i. Introduction
This section of the article will consider the decisions of major 
international treaty bodies that reference human dignity in order to assist 
in clarifying the meaning of the phrase. Specifically, it will consider
decisions of the Human Rights Committee (CCPR), the Committee 
against Torture (CAT), the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (Committee), the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, CRPD, the Committee on 
Enforced Disappearances, the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR), and the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
which relate to the issue of human dignity.128 The research was 
conducted utilising the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
jurisprudence database129 and considered those cases identified as 
addressing the issue of human dignity or referencing human dignity. In 
this respect, it is noted that the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR has only 
been in operation for a short time,130 and accordingly, CESCR has heard 
a limited number of cases pursuant to the individual complaints 
mechanism.131
The jurisprudence considered here indicates that the United Nations 
treaty bodies have not provided a clear definition of the term human 
128. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, Jurisprudence, OHCHR, http://juris.ohchr.org (last visited Apr. 13, 2017). 
129. See id. 
130. The Optional Protocol entered into force on 10 May 2013. See Optional 
Protocol to ICESCR Enters into Force, HUM. RIGHTS L. CENT. (May 10, 2013), 
https://www.hrlc.org.au/news/optional-protocol-to-icescr-enters-into-force. 
131. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, Statistical Survey on Individual Complaints, OHCHR,
http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cescr/pages/cescrindex.aspx (then follow “Statistical 
Survey on Individual Complaints” hyperlink under “Complaints Procedure”) (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2017). 
2017] Dignity in International Human Rights Law 21
dignity. Instead of directly defining the term, most discussion has 
focused on the acts and behaviours that constitute a violation of human 
dignity.132 In this respect, much of the case law focuses on Article 10 of 
the ICCPR, which provides that “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty 
shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity 
of the human person.”133 Article 10 places a positive obligation on states 
parties to guarantee the human dignity of those individuals deprived of 
their liberty.134 A strong relationship also exists between the requirement 
to respect human dignity in Article 10 and the prohibition on cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment in Article 7 of the 
ICCPR.135 In many cases, a violation of human dignity under Article 10 
is made out through a breach of Article 7.136 This use of Article 7 as a 
counterpart to Article 10 is indicative of a breach-based approach to 
outlining the nature of human dignity. 
While a concrete definition of human dignity is not provided by the 
treaty bodies, the case law provides guidance in terms of what constitutes 
an infringement of human dignity.137 The following forms of conduct, 
which may have potential applicability to a concept of animal dignity, 
have been considered to constitute a violation of human dignity under 
Article 10 of the ICCPR.138
132. A number of cases also discuss human dignity as outlined in domestic 
legislation, albeit without a focus on defining the concept or adopting a definition. 
133. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 10; see, e.g., Human Rights Comm., 
Communication No. 1405/2005, ¶ 9.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/110/D/1405/2005 (May 12, 
2014) [hereinafter Pustovoit]. 
134. See Human Rights Council, General Comment No. 21: Article 10, Humane 
Treatment of Persons Deprived of Their Liberty, ¶ 3 (Apr. 10, 1992); see also Pustovoit, 
supra note 133, ¶ 9.2.
135. See Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1860/2009, ¶ 3.6, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/111/D/1860/2009 (Sept. 4, 2014). 
136. See, e.g., id. (“Since Mr. Al-Rabassi was subjected to torture and cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment, in violation of article 7, while in custody, it is evident 
that he was not treated with humanity and respect for his dignity. Thus, the above-
mentioned incidents also entail a violation of article 10 of the Covenant.”); see also
Human Rights Comm., Views: Communication 1486/2006, ¶ 4.16, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/93/D/1486/2006 (Aug. 5, 2008); see also Human Rights Comm., 
Communication No. 1791/2008, ¶ 3.7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/107/D/1791/2008 (July 5, 
2013).
137. See discussion of case law infra Sections II.d.ii, II.d.iv, II.d.v. 
138. See discussion of case law infra Sections II.d.ii, II.d.iii, II.d.iv, II.d.v. 
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ii. Humiliating and Unnecessary Methods
The CCPR has identified that the use of humiliating and unnecessary 
methods in the detention of a person can constitute a violation of human 
dignity.139 In Cabal v. Australia it was found that the use of shackles, 
strip searches, and cavity searches in order to prevent a flight risk was 
found to be a violation of the complainant’s human dignity.140 Similarly, 
in Sharifova v. Tajikistan, the CCPR found that the use of physical force 
to extract a confession amounted to a violation of human dignity.141 This 
case law appears to align with the plain language meaning of human 
dignity outlined above because it is reflective of a belief that humans 
have some inherent quality worthy of respect and that (as per 
McCrudden’s framework)142 this type of treatment conflicts with that 
quality. It also aligns well with Luban’s argument that non-humiliation 
can act as a surrogate for human dignity.143
iii. Conditions of Detention
Poor conditions when in detention are clearly emphasized as a breach 
of human dignity.144 The use of small cells,145 limited or absent sanitation 
facilities,146 poor ventilation,147 lack of access to natural light,148 lack of 
139. See Human Rights Comm., Views: Communication No. 1020/2001, ¶¶ 2.5–
2.11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/1020/2001 (Sept. 19, 2003) [hereinafter Cabal v. 
Australia]; see also Human Rights Comm., Views: Communications Nos. 1209, 
1231/2003, & 1241/2004, ¶ 6.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/92/D/1209,1231/2003&1241/2004 
(Apr. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Sharifova v. Tajikistan]. 
140. Cabal v. Australia, supra note 139, ¶ 8.2. 
141. Sharifova v. Tajikistan, supra note 139, ¶ 6.3. 
142. See McCrudden, supra note 64, at 679. 
143. Luban, supra note 75, at 276–77. 
144. See generally Frowein, supra note 115, at 128–29.  
145. See Human Rights Comm., Views: Communication No. 899/1999, ¶¶ 2.1, 
5.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/899/1999 (July 25, 2002) [hereinafter Francis v. Trinidad] 
(where the cell was approximately 9 feet by 6 feet). See also Human Rights Comm., 
Views: Communication No. 683/1996, ¶ 9.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/683/1996 (June 
10, 2002) [hereinafter Wanza v. Trinidad]; see also Human Rights Comm., Views: 
Communication No. 1530/2006, ¶ 7.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/100/D/1530/2006 (Nov. 3, 
2010) [hereinafter Bozbey v. Turkmenistan].
146. Francis v. Trinidad, supra note 145, ¶¶ 2.3, 5.6; Human Rights Comm., 
Views: Communication No. 677/1996, ¶¶ 3.1, 9.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/677/1996 
(Apr. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Teesdale v. Trinidad]; Human Rights Comm., Views: 
2017] Dignity in International Human Rights Law 23
access to visitors,149 insufficient nourishment,150 lack of access to medical 
treatment,151 and limited or no access to the outside world152 all constitute 
a violation of human dignity. Yet, while it is clear that poor conditions 
can constitute a breach of human dignity, it is not clear what base level 
conditions are sufficient to respect human dignity. Nevertheless, that 
these type of conditions do violate human dignity helps to clarify the 
concept of human dignity because they suggest that a failure to meet 
basic human needs constitutes a violation of human dignity.    
iv. Inhumane Treatment
Inhumane treatment can take a number of forms and must attain “a
minimum level of severity to come within the scope of [A]rticle 10 of the 
[ICCPR].”153 In many cases, inhumane treatment is closely linked with 
the conditions of detention.154 For example, in Kozulina v. Belurus, it was 
Communication No. 1870/2009, ¶ 2.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/99/D/1870/2009 (Aug. 11, 
2010) [hereinafter Sobhraj v. Nepal];Human Rights Comm., Views: Communication No. 
938/2000, ¶¶ 2.3, 6.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/938/2000 (Aug. 19, 2004) [hereinafter 
Siewpersaud v. Trinidad]; Human Rights Comm., Views: Communication No. 721/1996, 
¶ 2.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/721/1996 (Apr. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Boodoo v. 
Trinidad]. 
147. Francis v. Trinidad, supra note 145, ¶ 2.3; Wanza v. Trinidad, supra note 
145, ¶ 3.3; Teesdale v. Trinidad, supra note 146, ¶ 3.1; Siewpersaud v. Trinidad, supra 
note 146, ¶ 2.3.
148. Francis v. Trinidad, supra note 145, ¶ 2.3; Teesdale v. Trinidad, supra note 
146, ¶ 3.1.
149. Teesdale v. Trinidad, supra note 146, ¶ 3.1. 
150. Bozbey v. Turkmenistan, supra note 145, ¶ 2.5; Human Rights Comm., 
Views: Communication No. 1776/2008, ¶¶ 2.6, 2.7, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/100/D/1776/2008 (Nov. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Bashasha v. Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya].
151. Human Rights Comm., Views: Communication No. 695/1996, ¶ 2.1, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/695/1996 (Nov. 5, 2001); see Teesdale v. Trinidad, supra note 146, ¶ 
3.1; Sobhraj v. Nepal, supra note 146, ¶ 2.4; Bashasha v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, supra 
note 150, ¶ 2.7.
152. Wanza v. Trinidad, supra note 145, ¶ 9.2; Boodoo v. Trinidad, supra note 
146, ¶¶ 2.2, 6.4.
153. Human Rights Comm., Views: Communication No. 1184/2003, ¶ 9.2, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/86/D/1184/2003 (Apr. 27, 2006).
154. See Human Rights Comm., Views: Communication No. 1126/2002, ¶ 7.2, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1126/2002 (Nov. 17, 2005); Francis v. Trinidad, supra note 
145, ¶ 5.6; Human Rights Comm., Views: Communication No. 1422/2005, ¶ 6.5, U.N.
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found that the complainant was not afforded humane treatment, in 
violation of Article 10 of the ICCPR, due to a denial of access to counsel 
and an independent doctor during a hunger strike while in prison.155
Similarly, in Komarovski v. Turkmenistan, a United States journalist was 
detained in Turkmenistan without charge, denied counsel, held 
incommunicado, and injected with a psychotropic substance while in 
detention.156 The CCPR concluded that “he was treated inhumanely and 
without respect for his inherent dignity, in violation of [A]rticle 10, 
paragraph 1, of the [ICCPR].”157 In Sharifova v. Tajikistan, the CCPR 
found a violation of human dignity due to ill-treatment at the hands of 
the police, which included coercion of confessions and torture.158 As with 
cases relating to conditions of detention, these cases suggest that a failure 
to meet basic human needs such as medical care will amount to a 
violation of human dignity. Further, similar to cases involving 
humiliating and unnecessary methods, instances of inhumane treatment 
indicate that such treatment fails to respect some inherent quality in 
human beings. 
v. Additional Applications of Human Dignity
Case law outside of the above particular categories further elucidates
the meaning of human dignity. In Wackenheim v. France, a prohibition 
on dwarf throwing within commercial entertainment was upheld by the 
CCPR because the ban “was necessary in order to protect public order, 
which brings into play considerations of human dignity that are 
compatible with the objectives of the [ICCPR].”159 The suggestion 
appears to be that permitting dwarf throwing may engage human dignity 
Doc. CCPR/C/91/D/1422/2005 (Nov. 13, 2007); Human Rights Comm., Views: 
Communication No. 1520/2006, ¶ 6.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/98/D/1520/2006 (Apr. 30, 
2010).
155. Human Rights Comm., Views: Communication No. 1773/2008, ¶¶ 2.1, 2.13, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/112/D/1773/2008 (Jan. 14, 2015). 
156. Human Rights Comm., Views: Communication No. 1450/2006, ¶¶ 2.7–2.10, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/93/D/1450/2006 (Aug. 5, 2008).
157. Id. ¶ 7.5.
158. Sharifova v. Tajikistan, supra note 139, ¶ 6.2.
159. Human Rights Comm., Views: Communication No. 854/1999, ¶ 7.4, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999 (July 26, 2002); see also ROSEN, supra note 86, at 67. For 
further discussion see id. at 63–67. 
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considerations under the ICCPR; perhaps it may constitute humiliating 
treatment. In Abramova v. Belarus, the Committee found that the 
complainant’s privacy and dignity was not respected as a result of sexual 
harassment and discrimination, in contravention of Articles 7 and 10(1) 
of the ICCPR.160 This may be because sexual harassment constitutes 
humiliation or possibly that a failure to accord equality breaches human 
dignity. 
While jurisprudence relating to human dignity has been largely 
concerned with Articles 7 and 10 of the ICCPR, the application of human 
dignity does extend beyond these Articles and beyond the ICCPR.161 For 
example, in Lopez Rodriguez v. Spain, the CESCR noted that “social 
security is of central importance in guaranteeing human dignity for all 
persons when they are faced with circumstances that deprive them of 
their capacity to fully realize their Covenant rights.”162 In this context, it 
appears that human dignity requires that individuals are able to meet 
their basic living needs.163
e. Conclusion: Meaning of Dignity in International Human Rights
Law
The basic meaning of dignity in international human rights law is 
clear. Human dignity refers to the inherent worth possessed equally by 
all human beings, which demands respect from others.164 This is apparent 
from the dictionary and contextual meanings as well as McCrudden’s 
basic minimum framework.165 These are also the key elements common 
160. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Views: 
Communication No. 23/2009, ¶ 5.5, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/49/D/23/2009 (Sept. 27, 
2011).
161. As noted above, for example, human dignity is referenced in Article 13 of the 
ICESCR. ICESCR, supra note 5, art. 13. See also CRC, supra note 6, arts. 23(1), 28(2), 
37(c), 39, 40(1).
162. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Communication No. 1/2013, ¶ 
10.1, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/57/D/1/2013 (Apr. 20, 2016). 
163. See Antonio Cassese, Can the Notion of Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 
be Applied to Socio-Economic Conditions?, 2 EUR. J. INT’L L. 141, 143–44 (1991).  
164. Chapman, supra note 122, at 3; see also Barroso, supra note 37, at 360; see
also McCrudden, supra note 64, at 722–23. 
165. See Dignity, supra note 71; see generally McCrudden, supra note 64, at 675–
80.
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to the textual and historical meanings of human dignity as well as the 
purpose of the relevant international human rights law documentation. 
Further, the utilisation of the term dignity by the international treaty 
bodies supports an interpretation of the term as attributing dignity to all 
human beings equally and focuses on identifying conduct that is 
considered a breach of human dignity or, in other words, a failure by 
others to respect human dignity. Such treatment includes extreme 
humiliation, failure to meet basic human needs, and failure to accord 
equality to all human beings.166
Nevertheless, it is apparent that there is some conflict in the details of 
the various accounts of human dignity discussed above. For some, 
dignity is possessed only by human beings; for others, dignity may 
extend beyond humans.167 Dignity may be based on autonomy (in terms 
of morality), reason, or conscience.168 These discrepancies may go some 
way towards explaining why the concept has been attacked for its 
vagueness and why there has been some disagreement as to its meaning 
and requirements,169 both within and across jurisdictions.170 To the extent 
that the meaning of dignity in relation to these details is unclear, and to 
the extent that the meaning must be interpreted in the circumstances of 
each case, it is accepted that the term human dignity lacks some clarity.    
Despite the lack of absolute clarity of the meaning of the term dignity, 
dignity performs an essential function in international human rights law. 
In essence, ascribing dignity to an individual means that the individual 
has moral worth equal to others and that must be respected by others. As 
the Constitutional Court of South Africa noted, “[r]ecognising a right to 
dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of human 
166. See discussion of case law supra Section II.d. 
167. Cf. ROSEN, supra note 86, at 12, 17 (considering the positions of Cicero and 
Aquinas). 
168. Cf. id. at 22 (considering Kant’s position on the meaning of dignity); see also 
Finegan, supra note 87, at 186; see e.g., UDHR, supra note 5, art. 1. 
169. Samantha Besson, Justifications, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, 
supra note 10, at 34, 46; Luban, supra note 75, at 274; The Vacuous Concept of Dignity,
supra note 66, 
at 260; Steven Pinker, The Stupidity of Dignity, 28, 28 (May 2008); Ruth Macklin, 
Dignity is a Useless Concept: It Means No More Than Respect for Persons or Their 
Autonomy, 327 BRIT. MED. J. 1419, 1420 (2003); see also Chapman, supra note 122, at 3. 
170. McCrudden, supra note 64, at 655. 
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beings.”171 To think of an individual as being “possessed of human 
dignity, simply is to think of him [or her] as a potential maker of 
claims.”172 Thus, the true function of dignity is to join individuals “within 
the community of moral equals.”173
III. THE POTENTIAL OF A CONCEPT OF ANIMAL DIGNITY
Having discussed the meaning of the concept of human dignity, this 
section considers whether it would make sense to discuss animal dignity. 
While the view may be debated, it has generally been considered by 
philosophers and ethicists that animals must have moral status if they are 
to be considered to have an interest in not being mistreated.174 In this 
context, moral status refers to “when an animal can be recognised as a[n] 
. . . equal member, with humans, of the moral community.”175 Given that 
one of the aspects of dignity is that it must be respected by others, it 
would appear then that animals must have moral status if they are to have 
dignity.176 Some of the following arguments relate to moral status and are 
thus relevant. 
The following discussion is divided into three parts. Discussed first 
are the recent developments towards a recognition of international 
animal rights. Second, arguments against a concept of animal dignity will 
be discussed. Finally, this article discusses the desirability of drawing on 
a concept of animal dignity in constructing international legal animal 
rights. 
171. State v. Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at 328 para. (S. Afr.). 
172. Joel Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, 4 J. VALUE INQUIRY 243, 252
(1970).
173. Corbey, supra note 111, at 74. 
174. HUMANISING ANIMALS: CIVILISING PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 17. 
175. Id.
176. See generally DAVID DEGRAZIA, TAKING ANIMALS SERIOUSLY: MENTAL LIFE
AND MORAL STATUS 75 (1996). 
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a. Momentum Towards International Recognition of Animal
Rights
At present, there is no international convention or declaration in 
relation to animal rights or even in relation to animal welfare.177
Nevertheless, there has been significant movement towards such 
recognition.178 Movement towards an international recognition of animal 
rights by way of declaration or other documentation began in earnest at 
the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth 
century.179 The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights was the first text 
to assert the principle of equality of species in relation to the right to 
life.180 The Declaration was proclaimed at the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific & Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1978, 
although it was not adopted by UNESCO or any other international 
organisation.181 A revised version of the Declaration was adopted in 
1989.182 While neither text references animal dignity as providing the 
foundation for animal rights, both texts implicitly recognise the concept 
of animal dignity.183 In the 1978 version, Article 2(1) provides that “[a]ll 
animals are entitled to respect,” while Article 10(2) asserts that 
“[e]xhibitions and spectacles involving animals are incompatible with 
their dignity.”184 Similar provisions are included in the 1989 text.185
177. Joan Schaffner et al., Animal Rights: From Why to How, 22 ANIMAL L. 225, 
227 (2016); see also David Favre, An International Treaty for Animal Welfare, 18 
ANIMAL L. 237, 237 (2012); see also Miah Gibson, The Universal Declaration of Animal 
Welfare, 16 DEAKIN L. REV. 539, 540 (2011).
178. See Gail Tulloch & Steven White, A Global Justice Approach to Animal Law 
& Ethics, 6 AUSTL. ANIMAL PROTECTION L.J. 29, 29 (2011). 
179. Jean-Marc Neumann, The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights or the 
Creation of a New Equilibrium Between Species, 19 ANIMAL L. 91, 93 (2012) [hereinafter 
The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights or the Creation of a New Equilibrium 
Between Species].
180. Id. at 103–04.
181. Id. at 103.
182. Id. at 100.
183. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Animal Rights 1978, supra note 33, arts. 
2(1), 10(2); see also Universal Declaration of Animal Rights, arts. 2, 5(4) (revised 1989) 
[hereinafter Universal Declaration of Animal Rights 1989]. 
184. Universal Declaration of Animal Rights 1978, supra note 33, art 2(1), 10(2). 
185. Universal Declaration of Animal Rights 1989, supra note 183, arts. 2, 5(4). 
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Other more recent attempts to embed a recognition of animal rights or 
protect animal welfare have been made. For example, an International 
Convention for the Protection of Animals, drafted by the Committee for 
the Convention for the Protection of Animals in 1988, but never adopted, 
fails to recognise dignity but does assert that “[l]ife has intrinsic 
value.”186 Further, the Universal Declaration on Animal Welfare 
represents “an attempt to secure international legal recognition for the 
principles of animal welfare.”187 Although it has received endorsement in 
a number of high level forums and from numerous governments,188 the 
Universal Declaration on Animal Welfare has not yet been formally 
adopted.189 It does not reference animal dignity, although it recognises 
“that animals are sentient beings and . . . their welfare is an issue worthy 
of consideration and respect by Member States.”190 Similarly, the 
Universal Charter of the Rights of Other Species (2000) recognises that 
“by virtue of their sentience, [other species] make strong moral claims 
upon human beings.”191 The European Union also has a number of 
treaties relating to animal protection.192
Thus, there have been many efforts to recognise and protect animal 
rights or welfare in international law. In this respect, whether such 
recognition draws on the language of rights or welfare is not particularly 
important, as documents that provide for welfare protection can often 
186. See International Convention for the Protection of Animals, art. 1(2) 
(proposed Apr. 4, 1988), https://www.animallaw.info/treaty/international-convention-
protection-animals. 
187. Gibson, supra note 177, at 540. 
188. Id. at 542–43.
189. UDAW Universal Declaration for Animal Welfare, INT’L FUND FOR ANIMAL 
WELFARE, http://www.ifaw.org/australia/our-work/political-advocacy/udaw-universal-
declaration-animal-welfare (last visited Apr. 20, 2017). 
190. Draft Declaration on Animal Welfare at Universal Level: UDAW Proposal,
GLOBAL ANIMAL L. pmbl.(1) (2011), https://www.globalanimallaw.org/ 
database/universal.html. 
191. The Universal Charter of the Rights of Other Species, ALL-CREEATURES.ORG
pmbl.(1) (May 2013), http://www.all-creatures.org/articles/ar-universal-charter-rights-
species.html. 
192. International and Foreign Animal Law Research Guide: E.U. Treaties, GEO.
U.L. LIBR. (June 28, 2016 9:21 AM), http://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g 
=363480&p=2455787.
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operate in the same way as would rights protection.193 None of the efforts 
described, however, expressly base protection on a concept of animal 
dignity and only some implicitly recognise the concept. The next section 
of this article considers whether there are any compelling arguments 
against acknowledgement of animal dignity. 
b. Opposition to the Concept of Animal Dignity
i. Species Superiority Arguments
Arguments against a concept of animal dignity often posit that there is 
something special about human beings which places them above other 
animal species and to which dignity attaches.194 This is understandable,
as to assert that human beings have dignity simply because of their 
membership of the human species is a speciesist argument — it gives
preference to members of a particular species over members of other 
species purely on the basis of their species membership.195 Such an 
argument is akin to racism or sexism; for example, preference should be 
given to men over women simply because they are men.196 As 
Brownsword asserts, “any attempt to privilege the members of a 
particular species, including the members of the human species, merely 
by virtue of their species-membership will attract the charge of 
‘speciesism’— such a response is arbitrary and it plainly will not do.”197
According to Cicero, it is the rational nature of human beings that 
places them in a superior position to other animals and which gives rise 
to human dignity.198 Similarly, according to Kant, humans have dignity 
193. See Clare McCausland, United Nations Declaration on Animal Welfare: Why 
Not Rights? REGARDING RTS. (Apr. 19, 2013), http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/regarding-
rights/2013/04/19/united-nations-declaration-on-animal-welfare-why-not-rights/. 
194. Assuming, of course, that a clear distinction can be made. See WAISMAN,
FRASCH, & WAGMAN, supra note 23, at 48. 
195. Roger Brownsword, Bioethics Today, Bioethics Tomorrow: Stem Cell
Research and the Dignitarian Alliance, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 15, 22 
(2003).  
196. See PAOLA CAVALIERI, THE ANIMAL QUESTION: WHY NONHUMAN ANIMALS
DESERVE RIGHTS 70–85 (Catherine Woollard trans. 2001). 
197. Brownsword, supra note 195, at 22.  
198. Finegan, supra note 87, at 202; see also ROSEN, supra note 86, at 11–12. 
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as a result of their moral rationality and ability to make their own 
decisions.199 More recently, Lee and George make the argument that it is 
human beings’ rational nature that causes them to excel over other beings 
and which establishes dignity.200 The argument appears to be reflected in 
Article 1 of the UDHR, which (as noted above) refers to “reason and 
conscience,” suggesting there may be a link between these qualities and 
dignity.201 The consequence of these arguments is that because animals 
do not share these characteristics, they cannot have dignity.202  
Kateb also makes the argument that there is something special about 
human beings which founds dignity, but takes a slightly different 
approach from that described above. Kateb asserts that “[t]he subject of 
human dignity is the worth of human beings or their high rank, or even 
their special place in nature.”203 According to him, it is the ability of 
human beings to break with nature that places them in a position of 
superiority to other species.204
The common thread among the species superiority arguments is that 
there is something in human cognition — an ability to think, reason, and
make choices — which is posited as being the foundation of dignity.205
There are, however, two major problems with these arguments.206 First, it 
is not clear why these particular characteristics (rationality, conscience, 
reason, and choice) should found dignity as opposed to other possible 
attributes, such as sentience.207 Lee and George assert that rationality is 
the foundation of human dignity on the basis that it is rationality that 
leads us to make choices to pursue human goods, such as “human life 
199. Philipp Balzer et al., Two Concepts of Dignity for Humans and Non-Human 
Organisms in the Context of Genetic Engineering, 13 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 7, 9
(2000); see also FRONTIERS OF JUSTICES: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES
MEMBERSHIP, supra note 39, at 131; see also JAMES RACHELS, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY 114 (1986); see also ROSEN, supra note 86, at 30. 
200. Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity, 21 
RATIO JURIS 173, 174 (2008). 
201. Finegan, supra note 87, at 186; see also UDHR, supra note 5, art. 1. 
202. Corbey, supra note 111, at 69. 
203. KATEB, supra note 39, at ix. 
204. Id. at x. 
205. Ash, supra note 41, at 197.  
206. See Corbey, supra note 111, at 69; see also FRONTIERS OF JUSTICES:
DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP, supra note 39, at 131–32.
207. Corbey, supra note 111, at 69; see also Pocar, supra note 32, at 223. 
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and health, speculative knowledge or understanding,” and that these 
human goods are shared objects of pursuit among all humans.208 This is 
an anthropocentric argument, however, in that it bases dignity on the 
means used to pursue human goods.209 If, instead, dignity was based on 
the means used to pursue the goods of another species, it is likely that 
humans would not meet the requirements for the attribution of dignity.  
The second major issue with the species superiority argument is that 
characteristics such as reason and rationality are not necessarily 
exclusive to humans and do not necessarily belong to all humans.210 In 
relation to the possibility of some animals exhibiting typically human 
mental capabilities, Cavalieri notes that  
a pluralistic approach [to] incorporating human phenomenology, 
nonhuman behaviour, functional-evolutionary arguments and 
physiology [has] led many authors to assert that all mental phenomena 
we find in humans can be found in the other animals, and that the most 
important capacities traditionally conceptualized as all-or-nothing —
self-consciousness, capacity for autonomy, rationality, capacity for 
moral agency and so on — are instead multidimensional and
gradational.211  
In this respect, a “prominent international group of cognitive 
neuroscientists, neuropharmacologists, neurophysiologists, 
neuroanatomists and computational neuroscientists” recently declared 
that “non-human animals [also] have the neuroanatomical, 
neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states 
along with the capacity to exhibit intentional [behaviours].”212 So there 
is, at least, a strong argument that such characteristics are not exclusive 
to humans.  
208. Lee & George, supra note 200, at 188. 
209. See HUMANISING ANIMALS: CIVILISING PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 31–32. 
210. FRONTIERS OF JUSTICES: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP,
supra note 39, at 131–32; see also Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical Basis,
supra note 21, at 1507; see also WAISMAN, FRASCH, & WAGMAN, supra note 23, at 50; 
see generally Bartlett, supra note 21, at 149–50. 
211. CAVALIERI, supra note 196, at 78. 
212. Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness, FCM CONFERENCE (July 7, 2012), 
http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf. 
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It is also clear that characteristics such as reason and rationality do not 
belong to all humans.213 Very young children, people experiencing 
mental impairment, and elderly people experiencing the loss of mental 
faculties may not have these mental attributes.214 At least some human 
beings then, do not share these human characteristics. To posit that 
dignity rests on such characteristics will result in an exclusion of these 
human beings from the moral status of dignity and the respect that it 
demands. In other words, if human beings have dignity because of their 
rationality (or other human characteristic), and therefore must be 
respected via an entitlement to human rights, then human beings without 
rationality will not be entitled to human rights. This would result in the 
unpalatable situation in which very young children, mentally impaired 
human beings, and elderly people could be tortured, subjected to 
experimentation, and so forth because of their lack of rationality. It is 
unlikely that anyone would accept such an outcome.  
ii. Correspondence Between Morally Relevant
Characteristics and Species or Morally Relevant
Characteristics and Human Nature
An argument sometimes presented in response to the difficulty of 
finding an attribute that distinguishes all human beings from all animals 
is that some basic aspect of human beings (whether or not an individual 
has that aspect) is superior to aspects of other species.215 As Cavalieri 
notes, this argument can take two very closely related forms.216 First, in 
an approach referred to by Cavalieri as “the correspondence approach,” it 
has been argued that “moral status [and accordingly dignity] depends not 
on a particular being’s actual capacities but on the capacities that are 
typical of its kind.”217 This appears to involve some assessment as to 
what the typical or average capacities are of different species, followed 
by an assessment as to the relative merit of those typical capacities.218
213. Pocar, supra note 32, at 220. 
214. See HUMANISING ANIMALS: CIVILISING PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 32. 
215. See CAVALIERI, supra note 196, at 74, 77; see also Lee & George, supra note 
200, at 190. 
216. See CAVALIERI, supra note 196, at 73–79. 
217. Id. at 74 (referring to arguments presented by Thomas Scanlon). 
218. Id. at 77. 
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Following this analysis, if members of biological Group A typically 
possess a characteristic deemed morally relevant to a greater extent than 
biological Group B, then members of biological Group A may be 
accorded dignity whereas members of biological Group B may not be.  
The correspondence approach is undermined by a significant 
weakness. The consequence of the approach (according dignity on the 
basis of characteristics typical of kind) will only appear morally just 
where there is no overlap between biological groups.219 In other words, if 
there are members of biological Group B that happen to possess the 
morally relevant characteristic to a greater extent than some members of 
biological Group A, then denying them dignity while according dignity 
to those members of Group A would appear to be unjust. The example 
proffered by Cavalieri highlights this injustice.220 This example consists 
of giving the right to life exclusively to members of a group that
typically possess a morally relevant characteristic.221 If Mary was a 
member of that group, but John was not, then it will be wrong to kill 
Mary but right to kill John, even if Mary and John possess the morally 
relevant characteristic to an equal extent.222 Singer provides a second 
example — if we assess that it is a typical characteristic of females that
they are good at looking after children, but that males do not share this 
characteristic, then the correspondence approach would require that 
females stay home and look after children.223 This would be so even for 
females who demonstrated less capacity to look after children than some 
males.224
Very similar to the correspondence approach is the argument that the 
nature of a human being is somehow different, and superior to, animal 
nature.225 As Cavalieri identifies, this argument appears to require an 
assessment of what human nature is, rather than a quantitative type 
219. Id. at 74. 
220. See id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. SINGER, supra note 21, at 240–41.
224. Id. 
225. CAVALIERI, supra note 196, at 77 (referring to arguments presented by Carl 
Cohen). This argument has also been expressed in the language of a species “root form.”
See Lee & George, supra note 200, at 190–91.
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assessment of average capacities.226 Thus, if we deem rationality to be a 
morally relevant characteristic, and assess that rationality is part of 
human nature and not part of animal nature, then moral status (and 
dignity) should be exclusively the domain of human beings, including 
those who are not actually rational. This approach, however, suffers from 
evidentiary weakness.227 Reference to the genetic structures of different 
species indicates that human beings “do not constitute a distinct family, 
nor even a distinct genus.”228 Further, reference to psychological 
characteristics of different species leads to the conclusion that “all mental 
phenomena we find in humans can be found in . . . other animals.”229
Without reference to metaphysical or religious arguments, an approach 
relying on the distinctiveness of human nature is insupportable.230
iii. Lack of Normative Determinacy
Zuolo asserts that dignity is not an appropriate concept for 
recognising the importance of animals because it fails to meet the 
requirement of normative determinacy.231 This requirement, as put 
forward by Zuolo, is that “dignity includes a prescriptive dimension 
beyond its including intrinsic value.”232 In other words, recognition of 
dignity must lead to some practical requirement. In this argument, 
however, Zuolo overlooks the nature of the prescription within the 
current legal conception of human dignity, which is to respect the human 
rights agreed to by states parties to the relevant conventions.233 Adopting 
the same approach, a conception of animal dignity will have normative 
determinacy by virtue of animal rights agreed to by states parties to a 
relevant convention.  
226. See CAVALIERI, supra note 196, at 77. 
227. See id. at 78–79.  
228. Id. at 78. 
229. Id. 
230. See id. at 79. 
231. See Federico Zuolo, Dignity and Animals. Does it Make Sense to Apply the 
Concept of Dignity to All Sentient Beings?, 19 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 1117,
1117 (2016).  
232. Id. at 1120. 
233. For example, the ICCPR and the ICESCR both recognise that “rights derive 
from the inherent dignity of the human person” and proceed to set out what these rights 
are. ICCPR, supra note 5, pmbl.; ICESCR, supra note 5, pmbl.
36 Michigan State ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ5HYLHZ [Vol. 26.1 
Zuolo’s opposition to extending dignity to animals seems to be that 
the same concept, dignity, must result in the same treatment (humans and 
non-humans must be accorded the same rights).234 Yet even if the 
underlying concept (dignity) is the same, normative determinacy should 
not be interpreted to require the same treatment, but rather to require a 
prescriptive dimension. As DeGrazia identifies, acknowledging equal 
moral worth does not mean that animals should have the same rights as 
humans, should be treated equally to humans, or that there are no morally 
relevant differences between animals and humans.235 Acknowledging the 
dignity of all animals will require a prescriptive dimension in the event 
that it gives rise to rights. Just because different animals may require 
different rights, or different actions to enable the enjoyment of rights, 
does not mean the prescriptive dimension is lost. 
iv. Vacuousness of the Concept of Dignity
It is accepted that the concept of dignity lacks clarity in some 
respects. It might therefore be argued that the vacuousness of the 
concept236 in itself is a sufficient reason not to utilise it in any 
international recognition of animal rights. In this respect, Bagaric and 
Allan’s argument is that dignity is “incapable of explaining or justifying 
any narrower interests.”237 The issue is well illustrated by reference to 
contexts in which dignity may be called upon to determine a conflict, but 
where the argument can be reframed to advocate polar opposite 
outcomes.238 For example, in relation to the debate surrounding 
euthanasia, opponents may argue that respect for the dignity of human 
life should compel rejection of euthanasia, whereas proponents might 
argue that respecting human dignity requires respecting the individual 
wishes of the person seeking access to euthanasia.239 Bagaric and Allan 
conclude that for dignity “to provide meaningful guidance” in relation to 
234. See Zuolo, supra note 231, at 1124–26.
235. DEGRAZIA, supra note 176, at 37. 
236. The Vacuous Concept of Dignity, supra note 66, at 260. 
237. Id.
238. See id. at 267 (citing Gosselin v. Québec, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (Can.)). 
239. The Vacuous Concept of Dignity, supra note 66, at 266; see generally SCOTT
CUTLER SHERSHOW, DECONSTRUCTING DIGNITY: A CRITIQUE OF THE RIGHT-TO-DIE
DEBATE 85–97 (2014). 
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the operation of rights, “a number of matters need to [be] resolved, 
including the meaning and justification of dignity.”240
Yet, to the extent that the concept of dignity lacks clarity, this does 
not mean that it is without merit. In contemporary international law, 
human rights are underpinned by reference to dignity,241 and this 
situation will not change in the foreseeable future. As discussed above, 
the concept of dignity operates in international human rights law to 
include human beings in a category of those with equal intrinsic moral 
worth which must be respected by others.242 For such a category to exist 
in the law, and to exclude animals from membership of that category, 
would imply that animals are not morally relevant in the same way as 
human beings are. It would suggest, in other words, that whatever 
‘rights’ are granted to animals, they are secondary to human rights. 
While it is possible for international law to provide improved recognition 
and protection for animals without recognising animal dignity, it is 
suggested that recognition of such dignity would be reflective of a 
paradigm change from valuing animals based on their worth to human 
beings to valuing animals based on their own inherent worth. 
c. Should Dignity Underpin an International Recognition of
Animal Rights?
The concept of dignity is utilised in international law to recognise the 
equal moral worth of an individual, which must be respected by others. 
The above discussion of the meaning of dignity indicates that, while the 
concept has been used as a way of differentiating humans from animals, 
the concept is not necessarily specific to human beings and may extend 
to animals, or even beyond animals. Further, consideration of the 
arguments against recognition of animal dignity indicate that there is no 
persuasive reason why animals should not be considered to have 
dignity.243 It is contended that, as dignity is used in relation to human 
beings in international human rights law, a failure to use it in relation to 
240. The Vacuous Concept of Dignity, supra note 66, at 263. 
241. See discussion supra Section II.a. 
242. See discussion supra Section II.e. 
243. See discussion supra Section III.b. 
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animals would suggest that they are not entitled to equal moral status and 
would thus perpetuate the cruelty towards and exploitation of animals. 
Beyond conceptual reasons why dignity cannot be exclusive to human 
beings, time spent with animals will suggest that that they do have 
dignity. Many animals share “human” attributes such as intelligence, 
emotion, and social bonds.244 It is clear that many animals can experience 
pleasure, enjoyment, pain, distress, fear, anxiety, and suffering.245
Research also indicates that some animals have the capacity to 
comprehend and use languages.246 Further, “[h]igher order animals also 
seem to have self-awareness” and “some animals are capable of 
metacognition.”247 More importantly, intuition indicates that animals do 
have dignity. Taking the approach of Oscar Schachter (“I know it when I 
see it even if I cannot tell you what it is”),248 even those who argue 
against animal dignity can recognize when it is violated. Zuolo, for 
example, writes,  
we may think that capturing a wild animal and keeping it in captivity is 
a violation of its dignity. I suspect many people would share this moral 
reaction if they see, for instance, a lion in a cage. In this case, the idea 
of dignity serves to express a sense of indignation caused by the 
experience of seeing an animal in such an unnatural condition. My 
sense is that this is a genuine and probably sensible moral response.249
Recognising animal dignity in international law is important in terms 
of codifying, encouraging, and cementing change in societal values.250
This change can be seen in domestic legislation and case law in a number 
244. WAISMAN, FRASCH, & WAGMAN, supra note 23, at 50; see also Thomas G. 
Kelch, Toward A Non-Property Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531, 563 
(1998).
245. DEGRAZIA, supra note 176, at 128. 
246. Id. at 198. 
247. HUMANISING ANIMALS: CIVILISING PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 14–15. Here, 
higher order animals refers to “[a]nimals of relatively advanced or developed 
characteristics . . . .” Higher Animals, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/higher_animals (last visited Oct. 31, 2017). 
248. Schachter, supra note 75, at 849. 
249. Zuolo, supra note 231, at 1128. 
250. Schaffner et al., supra note 177, at 241. 
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of jurisdictions.251 For example, Article 120(2) of the Federal 
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation provides that “[t]he 
Confederation shall legislate on the use of reproductive and genetic 
material from animals, plants and other organisms. In doing so, it shall 
take account of the dignity of living beings . . . .”252 In India, the High 
Court of the State of Kerala held that “circus animals are ‘beings entitled 
to dignified existence’ under the Indian Constitution’s Article 21, which 
protects the right to life with dignity.”253 The German Animal Welfare 
Act of 2006 recognises the responsibility of human beings to protect 
animals.254 More recently, in New Zealand, the Animal Welfare 
Amendment Act (No 2) 2015 was passed which explicitly recognises that 
animals are sentient.255
Acknowledgement of animal dignity in legal documentation could 
utilise the word dignity or a synonym phrase, such as intrinsic worth or 
inherent value. As with most human rights documentation, recognition 
would be best placed in a preamble to a declaration or convention. In 
terms of the prescriptive requirements of what dignity entails, this would 
comprise the agreed rights to be attributed to animals (or a particular 
species). Although it is outside the scope of this article to discuss what 
rights should be attributed to animals, it is suggested that these could be 
based on the capabilities of different species.256 Further, the meaning of 
dignity, to the extent that it informs agreed rights, could be approached 
(as per human dignity) from a breach-based perspective.257 For example, 
using humiliating and unnecessary methods, providing inadequate 
251. See, e.g., BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, 
art. 120 (Switz.); see also Nair, AIR 2000, ¶ 13; see also Tierschutzgesetz [TierSchG] 
[Animal Welfare Act], § 1, translation at https://www.animallaw.info/statute/germany-
cruelty-german-animal-welfare-act [hereinafter German Animal Welfare Act]; see also 
Animal Welfare Amendment Act (No. 2) 2015, s 4(i) (N.Z.) [hereinafter New Zealand 
Animal Welfare Act].
252. BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 
120(2) (Switz.) (emphasis added).
253. PAUL WALDAU, ANIMAL RIGHTS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 107–08 
(2011). 
254. German Animal Welfare Act, § 1. 
255. New Zealand Animal Welfare Act, § 4(i). 
256. FRONTIERS OF JUSTICES: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP,
supra note 39, at 326; see also Nataša Stojanović, Which Animal Rights Should be 
Recognised?, 3 BELGRADE L. REV. 75, 75 (2016).
257. See discussion supra Section II.d.i. 
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conditions of detention, or inhuman treatment in relation to animals may 
be held to constitute a breach of specific agreed animal rights as 
informed by the concept of dignity.258
Nevertheless, the overriding concern in developing international law 
in relation to animals should be the improvement of recognition and 
protection for animals. To achieve these objectives, it is important to take 
into account political considerations, including the feasibility of 
persuading states to support proposed laws. For example, it has been 
argued that instruments that adopt the language of rights as opposed to 
welfare in relation to animals “are unlikely to be successful” because 
they are unlikely to gain wide acceptance.259 If the incorporation of 
recognition of animal dignity into international legal documentation 
designed to recognise and protect animals were to provide an obstacle to 
consideration and acceptance of such documentation, then it would be 
better to dispense with the recognition of animal dignity. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Human dignity is intrinsic and must be respected. This concept also 
performs an important function in international human rights law in 
terms of identifying those individuals considered to be of equal moral 
worth.260 There are no compelling reasons why the concept of dignity 
does not also extend to animals.261 On the contrary, the clear need to 
improve recognition and protection of animals, the intuitive response that 
suggests that animals do have dignity, and changes in societal values all 
suggest the existence of animal dignity.  
This article argues that there is a concept of animal dignity that should 
be recognised in international law. This is because the concept has a 
common foundation with the concept of human dignity that underpins 
international human rights law and because such recognition would 
operate to encourage and cement a paradigm change in human attitudes 
towards animals. Although this article does not attempt to set out in 
detail how that recognition should be achieved, the analysis of dignity 
258. See Amy B. Draeger, More Than Property: An argument For Adoption of the 
Universal Declaration on Animal Welfare, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 277, 298 (2007).  
259. Gibson, supra note 177, at 550; see also Favre, supra note 177, at 239. 
260. See discussion supra Section II.e. 
261. See discussion supra Section III.b. 
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undertaken in this article suggests that, analogously with the recognition 
of human rights, animal dignity should be recognised in declarations or 
treaties that seek to improve recognition and protection of animals. At 
the same time, it is acknowledged that the overriding objective should be 
improved recognition and protection of animals in international law, and 
to the extent that recognition of animal dignity provides an obstacle to 
that objective, it may be preferable to dispense with such recognition.  
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